Litigation

10 2016 and 2017, Chisu purchased Cuban-origin explosives and explosive accessories from a third-party vendor, knowing the goods were of Cuban origin. The $45,908 settlement amount reflects OFAC's determination that Chisu's conduct was non-egregious and was not voluntarily self-disclosed. On April 25, Australia-based Toll Holdings Limited agreed to pay $6,131,855 to settle its potential civil liability for 2,958 apparent violations of multiple US sanctions programs, including against Iran, North Korea, Syria and those relating to terrorism and WMD-proliferators. Toll, an international freight forwarding and logistics company, is alleged to have originated or received payments through the US financial system involving sanctioned jurisdictions and persons in connection with sea, air and rail shipments conducted by Toll, its affiliates or suppliers to, from, or through North Korea, Iran, or Syria, or other entities on OFAC's SDN List. Specifically, between January 2013 and February 2019, Toll dealt in payments or funds transfers with sanctioned parties such as Iran's Mahan Air, Hafiz Darya Shipping Lines or otherwise in connection with shipments to, from, or transshipping through the DPRK, Iran or Syria. The apparent violations resulted from deficient policies and controls that would have caught US-dollar payments involving sanctioned jurisdictions and persons. For example, OFAC alleges that Toll would often structure its payment arrangements in ways that commingled payments associated with sanctioned activity with payments for non-sanctioned countries or persons, rather than isolating those transactions subject to sanctions before processing payments through US financial institutions. These compliance failures led Toll to cause US banks to export services to sanctioned jurisdictions or persons. OFAC noted that Toll voluntarily self-disclosed the Apparent Violations and that they constituted a non-egregious case On May 27, OFAC announced a settlement with Banco Popular de Puerto Rico ("BPPR") for $255,937.86 in connection with 337 apparent violations of the Venezuela sanctions regulations. The violations arise from the maintenance of personal accounts for individuals associated with the Government of Venezuela. Issued in 2019, E.O. 13884 blocks the property of the Government of Venezuela and defines the Government of Venezuela to include "any person owned or controlled, directly or indirectly" by the Government of Venezuela and "any person who has acted or purported to act directly or indirectly for or on behalf of" any such entity. According to OFAC, between August 15, 2019, and October 26, 2020, BPPR allegedly failed to identify four personal accounts belonging to two employees of the Government of Venezuela. Here, one of the customers worked in a clerical position at the Government of Venezuela's Diplomatic Representation Office and the other was a customer service representative at a state-owned entity, Compañía Anónima Nacional Teléfonos de Venezuela. OFAC noted that compliance failures ultimately led to the apparent violations. It took BPPR fourteen months to identify the customers as employees of the Government of Venezuela, despite having initiated due diligence upon the issuance of the Executive Order. In determining the penalty amount, OFAC noted that this was a non-egregious case and that BPPR voluntarily self-disclosed the violation.

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