Corporate Governance

2022 Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation Survey - 20th Annual

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Shearman & Sterling LLP 39 | PBCs and the Pursuit of Corporate Good While it is difficult to determine precisely how many PBCs exist because certain states do not distinguish a PBC from the non-PBC corporation, 7 there are estimated to be thousands of PBCs in Delaware and nationwide. 8 Initially, corporations in Delaware that elected to incorporate as a PBC tend to be small, closely held corporations, but larger and publicly traded firms are now opting for the PBC form with increasing frequency. 9 Warby Parker, for example, elected to become a PBC simultaneously with its initial public offering ("IPO") last year, and Lemonade, Inc. also successfully completed its IPO in 2020 as a PBC. 10 From 2013 to July 2020, there were only three publicly traded PBCs in Delaware. Today, there are 19 publicly traded PBCs. Some large and well-known public companies have also found it beneficial to acquire PBCs (or their state- specific equivalent) to operate these entities as subsidiaries. For example, Campbell Soup Company acquired Plum Organics, 11 which is a PBC with a mission to "deliver nourishing, organic food to our nation's little ones and to raise awareness and advance solutions for childhood hunger and malnutrition in the United States." 12 After Danone acquired WhiteWave Foods Co. in a take- private transaction in 2017, it incorporated the combined entity as a PBC, and today the plant-based, organic and health foods brand is the largest PBC in operation. THE 2020 AMENDMENTS TO THE PBC CODE The PBC Code adopted in 2013 required the approval of 90% of a corporation's outstanding stock, whether voting or non-voting, to adopt, or reverse, the PBC form. 13 For a large, publicly traded corporation, this high voting requirement meant that any attempt to convert into a PBC faced relatively significant uncertainty. In 2015, to respond to the challenges imposed by the high vote threshold, the PBC Code was amended to require only a two-thirds majority vote of outstanding voting stock to adopt, or reverse, the PBC form. 14 While the 2015 amendment loosened the PBC Code's voting requirements, it did little to impact the rate at which corporations adopted (or reversed) their PBC status. Thus, in 2020, the PBC Code was further amended to require only a simple majority of stockholder approval to convert to or from a PBC, making it more practical for publicly traded corporations to embrace the PBC form. 15 The 2020 Amendments also eliminated the statutory appraisal rights of stockholders in connection with the conversion to or from PBC form, which decreased the risk of becoming a PBC because corporations have less worry about costly litigation over appraisal rights and appraisal payouts to dissenting stockholders. 16 The 2020 Amendments importantly clarified certain aspects of directors' fiduciary duties, providing some assurance to boards of directors contemplating adopting the PBC form. 17 Before the 2020 Amendments, the PBC code provided "a public benefit corporation shall be managed in a manner that balances the stockholders' pecuniary interests, the best interests of those materially affected by the corporation's conduct, and the public benefit or public benefits identified in its certificate of incorporation." 18 The 2020 Amendments added Section 365(c) to clarify that a director's failure to satisfy the balancing requirement does not constitute an act or omission not in good faith or a breach of the duty of loyalty for purposes of the exculpation or indemnification of directors unless the PBC's certificate of incorporation provides otherwise. 19 Section 365(c) also clarified that a director's ownership or other interest in the PBC's stock will not constitute a conflict of interest that would call into question the director's decision made after balancing the interests of all parties, so long as the ownership interest would not constitute a conflict of interest if the corporation were a non-PBC corporation. 20 7 See Michael B. Dorff, Why Public Benefit Corporations? 42 Del. J. Corp. L. 77, 79 (2017). 8 See Simmerman, et al. infra note 9. 9 See Amy L. Simmerman, Ryan J. Greecher, & Brian Currie, "Converting to a Delaware Public Benefit Corporation: Lessons from Experience," Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, https://corpgov.law.harvard. edu/2022/02/18/converting-to-a-delaware-public-benefit-corporation- lessons-from-experience (February 18, 2022). 10 See Twelfth Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation of Warby Parker Inc. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/ data/1504776/000162828021018962/exhibit42-resalesx8.htm. 11 See McKenzie Holden Granum, "With the Emergence of Public Benefit Corporations, Directors of Traditional For-Profit Companies Should Tread Cautiously, but Welcome the Opportunity to Invest in Social Enterprise," 38 Seattle U. L. Rev. 765, 766 https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/sulr/ vol38/iss2/21 (January 2015). 12 See Plum Organics, "Plum, PBC? What's a Public Benefit Corporation?," https://www.plumorganics.com/benefit-corp. 13 See Michael R. Littenberg, Emily J. Oldshue, & Brittany N. Pifer, "Delaware Public Benefit Corporations — Recent Developments," Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance https://corpgov.law.harvard. edu/2020/08/31/delaware-public-benefit-corporations-recent- developments; Richards Layton & Finger, "Delaware Governor Jack Markell Signs Legislation Amending the Delaware General Corporation Law," Richard Layton & Finger, https://www.rlf.com/delaware-governor-jack- markell-signs-legislation-amending-the-delaware-general-corporation-law (June 24, 2015). 14 See Littenberg, supra note 14. 15 Id. Del. Code Ann. Tit. 8, § 242(b), 251, Sections 363(a) and (c) were removed from the PBC Code (West 2020). 16 Id. 17 Id. 18 See Del. Code Ann. Tit. 8, § 362 (West 2015). 19 Id. 20 See Del. Code Ann. Tit. 8, § 335(c) (West 2020).

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